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Abstract 
Scientific realists claim that the best of successful rival theories is (approximately) true. 
Relative realists object that we cannot make the absolute judgment that a theory is successful, 
and that we can only make the relative judgment that it is more successful than its competitor. 
I argue that this objection is undermined by the cases in which empirical equivalents are 
successful. Relative realists invoke the argument from a bad lot to undermine scientific realism 
and to support relative realism. In response, I construct the argument from double spaces. It is 
similar to the argument from a bad lot, but threatens many philosophical inferences, including 
relative realists’ inference from comparative success to comparative truth.  
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1. Introduction 
Moti Mizrahi is a rising star in the scientific realism debate. Not surprisingly, he (2020) defends 
an original position that he calls “relative realism.” It holds that our best theories are closer to 
the truth than their alternatives. He takes this position to lie in the middle between scientific 
realism and antirealism. Since it is less committed to the claims of science than scientific 
realism is, it avoids some of the criticisms leveled at scientific realism. This article critically 
examines relative realism from the perspective of scientific realism.  
The outline of this article is as follows. In Section 2, I provide an example of a scientific 
claim to clarify what is involved in subscribing to relative realism. In Section 3, I clarify what 
it means say that a theory, T, is successful, and then argue that saying that T is successful 
implies that it appears to be true and empirically adequate. In Section 4, I argue that scientific 
realists are right to distinguish, while relative realists are wrong not to distinguish, between the 
best of unsuccessful rival theories and the best of successful rival theories. In Section 5, I 
critically respond to Mizrahi’s claim that Bas van Fraassen’s (1989) argument from a bad lot 
undermines scientific realism, but not relative realism. I construct an argument that I call “the 
argument from double spaces,” which is similar to the argument from a bad lot, but which 
undermines relative realism and other philosophical positions. 
 
2. Relative Realism 
Relative realism holds that “we have good reasons to believe that, from a set of competing 
scientific theories, the more empirically successful theory is comparatively true, that is, closer 
to the truth relative to its competitors in the set” (Mizrahi 2020, 115). The concept of 
comparative truth is distinct from that of approximate truth. To say that T is approximately true 
means that it is close to the truth. Suppose that two competing theories are completely false, 
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i.e., they are far from the truth and thus not approximately true. Yet, one of them might be 
comparatively true (Mizrahi 2020, 114). 
What is involved in subscribing to relative realism? Relative realists do not believe what 
T says about the world. They only believe that what T says about the world is closer to the 
truth than what its competitor says about the world. For example, evolutionary theory says that 
natural selection is the “process allowing the proliferation of organisms that are relatively better 
adapted to external environmental conditions” (Ansdell and Hanson 2016, 179). Relative 
realists do not believe what Ansdell and Hanson say about natural selection. They only believe 
that what Ansdell and Hanson say is closer to the truth than what an alternative to evolutionary 
theory says. Relative realists also admit that what Ansdell and Hanson say might be utterly 
false. Even if it is utterly false, it is still comparatively true, as long as what they say is closer 
to the truth than what the alternative says. By contrast, scientific realists believe what Ansdell 
and Hanson say about natural selection. 
 
3. Success 
Before evaluating relative realism, we need to be clear about the concept of success. Laudan 
states that “a theory is successful if it makes substantially correct predictions, if it leads to 
efficacious interventions in natural order, if it passes a battery of standard tests” (Laudan 1981, 
23). This definition clarifies what it means to say that T is successful. As far as I know, no 
other philosopher has made the notion of success clearer than Laudan. 
Let me further clarify the notion of success. To say that T is successful entails that “some 
of its observational consequences turned out to be true” (Park 2016, 604). Consequently, to 
attribute success to T is to make the epistemic claim that we know that some of what T says 
about observables are true. Consequently, if T is successful, we know that it is successful. It is 
implausible to say that T is successful, but that we do not know that it is successful. In other 
words, it is implausible to say that T has passed empirical tests, but that we do not know that it 
did. 
By contrast, to attribute empirical adequacy to T is to make the semantic claim that all 
of what it says about observables are true, but not the epistemic claim that we know that all of 
what it says about observables are true. Even if T were empirically adequate, we may not know 
that it is so, just as even if T were true, we may not know that it is so. Thus, it is conceptually 
sound to say that T is empirically adequate, but that we do not know that it is so, just as it is 
conceptually sound to say that T is true, but we do not know that it is so.  
This fundamental difference between success and empirical adequacy implies the 
following differences between them. Only one condition needs to be met for T to be empirically 
adequate, viz., whatever it says about observables is true. By contrast, many conditions need 
to be met for T to be successful (Park 2016, 604–615). For example, scientists should have 
financial resources. There should be oxygen in their laboratories. Unless such conditions are 
met, T cannot be successful, even if it is empirically adequate and in scientists’ hands. By 
contrast, T can be empirically adequate whether those conditions are met or not. An empirically 
adequate theory is empirically adequate whether or not scientists have the financial resources 
to ascertain its predictions. 
The success of T is a means to know that T has certain semantic properties, such as truth 
and empirical adequacy. In this sense, success is to a semantic property what light is to a 
physical object. Just as light enables us to see a physical object, so success enables us to see a 
semantic property. This difference between success and a semantic property is particularly 
important in this article. Saying that T is successful implies that it appears to have a certain 
semantic property, whether that semantic property is truth or empirical adequacy. However, its 
appearance might be misleading, i.e., although successful, T might be false and empirically 
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inadequate. In short, its appearance might disagree with its reality. Keep in mind that it is 
legitimate to distinguish between the appearance and the reality of T. 
 
4. Successful Rivals vs. Unsuccessful Rivals 
Scientific realists and relative realists make different judgments and inferences regarding T. 
Scientific realists make the absolute judgment that T is successful as well as the relative 
judgment that T is comparatively successful, and then infer that T is true. By contrast, relative 
realists only make the relative judgment that T is comparatively successful, and then infer that 
T is comparatively true. Scientific realists’ inference admittedly runs more epistemic risk than 
relative realists’ inference.  
However, I make the following defense of scientific realists’ inference in relation to 
relative realists’ inference. To use an analogy, suppose there are two NBA players: p1 and p2. 
We make the relative judgment that p1 is taller than p2. Still, we can make an absolute 
judgement that both are tall. Similarly, we make the relative judgement that T is closer to the 
truth than its alternative. Still, we can make the absolute judgment that they are approximately 
true. In short, we can make both relative and absolute judgments at the same time. 
Suppose T is closer to the truth than its alternative, but both are unsuccessful. In such a 
case, scientific realists would agree with relative realists that we have good reason to believe 
that T is comparatively true, but not that it is approximately true. But what if both are 
successful? For example, the caloric and kinetic theories competed with each other, and were 
both successful. Scientific realists would say that we have good reason to believe that they are 
both approximately true. Comparing between successful rivals is like comparing between the 
NBA players. Just as either of the NBA players is tall, so any of successful rivals is 
approximately true. In short, scientific realists distinguish between the best of unsuccessful 
rivals and the best of successful rivals, claiming that we have good reason to believe the former 
is comparatively true, but not that it is approximately true, while we have good reason to 
believe that the latter is both (approximately) and comparatively true.   
In contrast, relative realists do not distinguish between the best of unsuccessful rivals 
and the best of successful rivals. They claim that we have good reason to believe that both are 
comparatively true, but not that any of them is approximately true. On what grounds do they 
reject scientific realists’ view that the best of successful rivals is (approximately) true? Relative 
realists claim that we cannot make the absolute judgement that T is successful, although we 
can make the relative judgment that it is more successful than its alternative. Therefore, we 
cannot say that the best of successful rivals is (approximately) true. Mizrahi states that we 
cannot make “absolute judgments about scientific theories, such as T is well-confirmed, T is 
predictively successful, T is approximately true (that is, close to the truth), or T is likely true” 
(Mizrahi 2020, 126).  
Admittedly, we usually make the relative judgment that T is better confirmed than its 
competitor. It does not follow, however, that we cannot make the absolute judgment that both 
are highly confirmed. Many scientific realists and antirealists make the absolute judgment that 
past and current theories, such as the caloric and kinetic theories, are successful. Their absolute 
judgments mesh well with Laudan’s definition of success, cited in Section 2 above. Recall that 
to say that T is successful is to make the epistemic claim that we know that some of what T 
says about observables are true. In accordance with this definition, we can make the absolute 
judgment that both the caloric and kinetic theories are successful. 
Moreover, we cannot make a relative judgment, and can only make an absolute judgment 
about the success of T, when T competes with its empirical equivalents. Suppose Newton’s 
mechanics is composed of the law of gravity, the three laws of motion, and the assertion that 
the universe does not move in relation to absolute space. It competes with infinitely many 
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alternatives, which share the four laws with Newton’s mechanics, but which make different 
assertions about how fast the universe moves in relation to absolute space (van Fraassen 1980, 
46). All of these rival theories are empirically equivalent. It follows that, if one of them is 
successful, they are all equally successful. Since none of them is more successful than another, 
we cannot make the relative judgment that any is comparatively successful, and we can only 
make the absolute judgment that they are successful.  
This example of underdetermination weakens relative realism. Since none of the 
competitors is more successful than any other, relative realists cannot infer that any of them 
are comparatively true. By contrast, scientific realists can infer that they are all approximately 
true, provided that one of them is true, given that they share the four laws (Park 2014, 110). 
The best of the rivals is true, and even the worst of the rivals is approximately true. Again, 
comparing between successful rivals is like comparing between the NBA players. Even the 
smallest of the NBA players is tall. 
 
5. The Argument from Double Spaces 
Van Fraassen (1989) and Mizrahi (2020) would reject scientific realists’ contention that the 
best of successful rival theories is (approximately) true. They defend a famous argument 
against scientific realism called “the argument from a bad lot.” It holds that, even if T is the 
best of all the conceived competitors, we cannot conclude that it is true because there might be 
unconceived alternatives which are better than T, i.e., because T “may well be the best of a bad 
lot” (van Fraassen 1989, 143). Mizrahi (2020, 54 & 128) appeals to this argument to undermine 
scientific realism and to support relative realism.  
How do scientific realists respond to the argument from a bad lot? Park (2017a, 30–31) 
observes that the premise of the argument is a possibility statement, but its conclusion is a 
normative statement, and notes that such an argument would be rejected by David Hume 
(1888/1978, 469) who points out that a normative statement cannot be derived from a factual 
statement. In addition, Park (2017b, 61–62) argues that the argument from a bad lot, if correct, 
has a disastrous implication for van Fraassen’s positive views, such as his contextual theory 
(1980). 
In this article, I do not pursue these criticisms against the argument from a bad lot. 
Instead, I grant that it is correct, and then construct a similar argument, which has disastrous 
implications for relative realism and other philosophical positions. I call the similar argument 
“the argument from double spaces.” It is so named because it invokes two logical spaces of 
unconceived scientific theories, which I call “the T-space” and “the F-space.” Let me explicate 
these notions one by one. 
The T-space is inhabited by the unconceived scientific theories that are commonly fated 
to lead us to true beliefs about themselves. For this reason, the T-space is so named. Suppose 
scientists select a scientific theory from the T-space. They put it to empirical tests, and it 
succeeds. To say that it is successful means that it appears to be true. Since it is from the T-
Space, its appearance agrees with its reality. Its reality is that it is true. Thus, to say that its 
appearance agrees with its reality implies that it is true. Suppose, now, that T is more successful 
than its competitor, which means that it appears to be comparatively true. Since it is from the 
T-space, its appearance agrees with its reality. Its reality is that it is comparatively true. Thus, 
to say that its appearance agrees with its reality implies that it is comparatively true. 
By contrast, the F-space is inhabited by the unconceived scientific theories that are 
commonly fated to lead us to false beliefs about themselves. Suppose scientists select a 
scientific theory from the F-space. They put it to empirical tests, and it succeeds. To say that it 
is successful means that it appears to be true. Since it is from the F-space, however, its 
appearance disagrees with its reality. Its reality is that it is false. Thus, to say that its appearance 
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disagrees with its reality implies that it is false. Suppose, now, that it is more successful than 
its competitor, which means that it appears to be comparatively true. Since it is from the F-
space, however, its appearance disagrees with its reality. Its reality is that it is farther from the 
truth than its alternative, i.e., it is comparatively false. Thus, to say that its appearance disagrees 
with its reality implies that it is comparatively false. 
It is not just a figment of imagination that, even if T is more successful than its 
alternative, T might be farther from the truth than the alternative. Ptolemy compared his 
geocentric theory with the heliocentric theory (Frost-Arnold, 2019: 911). He chose the former 
over the latter, however, because it was more successful in light of the evidence he had. To 
take another example, caloric scientists considered the kinetic theory in the 19th century, but 
rejected it because the caloric theory was more successful than the kinetic theory in light of the 
evidence that they had. Several other such historical episodes can be found in Greg Frost-
Arnold (2019, 911–913). These episodes open up the possibility that the appearance of T might 
not accord with its reality, which implies that, even if T is comparatively successful, it might 
be comparatively false. 
The notions of the T-space and the F-space cast new light on how to understand T, a 
current theory. If T is successful and true, we can conclude that it was selected from the T-
space. By contrast, if T is successful but false, we can conclude that it was selected from the 
F-space. In addition, if T is comparatively successful and comparatively true, we can conclude 
that it was selected from the T-space. By contrast, if T is comparatively successful but 
comparatively false, we can conclude that it was selected from the F-space. The deliberation 
over whether T is true, or whether it is comparatively true, can be recast as a deliberation over 
whether it was selected from the T-space or the F-space.  
The argument from double spaces is an argument that asks for evidence that it is likely1 
that T was selected from the T-space, and not from the F-space, or for evidence that T was 
selected from the F-space, and not from the T-space. The burden of providing the evidence 
falls on those who believe that T has a certain semantic property, whether that semantic 
property is truth, comparative truth, falsity, comparative falsity, empirical adequacy, 
comparative empirical adequacy, empirical inadequacy, comparative empirical inadequacy, or 
what have you. Let me apply the argument from double spaces to scientific realists and 
antirealists first. 
Suppose scientific realists and antirealists observe that T is successful, and then infer 
that T is true and false, respectively. The argument from double spaces implies that scientific 
realists’ inference requires the prior belief that T was selected from the T-space. It also implies 
that scientific antirealists’ inference requires the prior belief that T was selected from the F-
space. In light of this request, scientific antirealists would retreat to the skeptical position that 
we do not know whether T was selected from the T-space or the F-space, and thus we do not 
know whether T is true or false. This skeptical position is free from the burden of showing that 
T was selected from the F-space. By contrast, scientific realists have the burden of showing 
that T was selected from the T-space. 
Let me turn to relative realists and relative antirealists. They observe that T is more 
successful than its alternative, and then infer that T is comparatively true and comparatively 
false, respectively. The argument from double spaces implies that relative realists’ inference 
requires the prior belief that T was selected from the T-space, and not from the F-space. It also 
implies that relative antirealists’ inference requires the prior belief that T was selected from the 
F-space, and not from the T-space. If T were selected from the T-space, its appearance would 
coincide with its reality, which means that, if it is comparatively successful, it is comparatively 
 
1
 I drop “likely” hereafter for the sake of brevity. 
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true. By contrast, if T were selected from the F-space, its appearance would not coincide with 
its reality, which means that, if T is comparatively successful, it is comparatively false. Relative 
realists have the burden of showing that scientists selected T from the T-space, and not from 
the F-space. By contrast, relative antirealists have the burden of showing that scientists selected 
T from the F-space, and not from the T-space. In light of this criticism, relative antirealists 
would retreat to the skeptical position that we do not know whether T is from the T-space or 
from the F-space. 
How does the argument from double spaces relate to the argument from a bad lot? The 
argument from a bad lot invokes unconceived alternatives, and then requests evidence that T 
is better than unconceived alternatives. By contrast, the argument from double spaces invokes 
T-space and F-space, and then requests evidence that T was selected from the T-space or that 
it was selected from the F-space. Both the T-space and the F-space are inhabited by 
unconceived scientific theories. Therefore, both the argument from a bad lot and the argument 
from double spaces invoke unconceived scientific theories. 
However, there is an important difference between the unconceived alternatives in the 
argument from a bad lot and the unconceived scientific theories in the argument from doubles 
spaces. The former are alternatives to our best theories, whereas the latter may or may not be. 
To say that an unconceived scientific theory is in the T-space simply means that it is fated to 
lead us to true beliefs about itself. To say that an unconceived scientific theory is in the F-space 
simply means that it is fated to lead us to false beliefs about itself. It is entirely irrelevant 
whether it is an alternative to a current theory.  
There are further similarities between the argument from a bad lot and the argument from 
doubles spaces. The argument from a bad lot states that, even if T is more successful than all 
the conceived alternatives, we cannot conclude that it is true because it “may well be the best 
of a bad lot” (van Fraassen 1989, 143). Note that the argument from a bad lot does not say that 
it is likely that T is the best of a bad lot. It only says that it is possible that T is the best of a bad 
lot. It also claims scientific realists bear the onus of showing that T is not the best of a bad lot, 
i.e., that T is better than its unconceived alternatives.  
Analogously, the argument from double spaces states that, even if T appears to have a 
certain semantic property, we cannot conclude that it has the semantic property because its 
appearance may be different from its reality, i.e., because T may be a selection from the F-
space. It does not say that it is likely that T was selected from the F-space, but only that it is 
possible that T was selected from the F-space. It also claims that those who believe that T has 
a certain semantic property have the burden of showing that T was selected from the T-space. 
As readers may have noted, the arguments from a bad lot and from double spaces make 
demanding requests. The former requests evidence that T is better than its unconceived 
alternatives. The latter requests evidence that T is from one space, and not from the other. It is 
beyond my imagination how humans can meet these requests. Only God, who has the cognitive 
capacity to conceive of all the competitors to T, can meet the demanding request of the 
argument from a bad lot. Only God, who has the cognitive power to penetrate the appearance 
of T, can meet the demanding request of the argument from double spaces. 
Just as relative realists (RR) run the argument from a bad lot against scientific realism, 
so scientific realists (SR) can run the argument from double spaces against relative realists. 
What would happen if they met with each other to debate whether T is true or comparatively 
true? The following dialogue would likely occur: 
 
RR: How can you deny that T is comparatively true when it is comparatively successful? 
It is obvious if it is comparatively successful, it is comparatively true. 
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SR: How can you deny that T is true when T is successful? It is obvious if T is successful, 
it is true.  
 
RR: Although T is successful, we cannot conclude it is true because it may be the best of 
a bad lot.  
 
SR: Although T is comparatively successful, we cannot conclude it is comparatively true 
because it may be a selection from the F-space.  
 
This imaginary stalemate between scientific and relative realists indicates that those who take 
the argument from a bad lot to be correct are led to skepticism about whether T has a certain 
semantic property. 
The argument from double spaces can also be turned against empiricism, which this 
article defines as the position that T is empirically adequate. Empiricists observe that T is 
successful and then infer that it is empirically adequate. The argument from double spaces 
implies that empiricists’ inference requires the prior belief that T was selected from the T-
space. If T were selected from the T-space, its appearance would agree with its reality, which 
means that, if T is successful, it is empirically adequate. By contrast, if T were selected from 
the F-space, its appearance would disagree with its reality, which means that, if T is successful, 
it is empirically inadequate. Empiricists have the burden of showing that T was selected from 
the T-space.  
The argument from double spaces also has a negative implication for the semantic 
account of scientific progress (Niiniluoto, 1984, 2014). According to the semantic account, 
“scientific progress can be defined by increasing verisimilitude” (Niiniluoto, 2014, 77). 
Replacing the geocentric theory with the heliocentric theory was progressive because the 
heliocentric theory was more verisimilar than the geocentric theory. The argument from double 
spaces implies that the proponents of the semantic account cannot conclude that the 
heliocentric theory was more verisimilar than the geocentric theory, although the former was 
more successful than the latter, because the former may have been selected from the F-space. 
The onus is on the proponents of the semantic account to show that the heliocentric theory was 
selected from the T-space. 
The argument from double spaces undercuts another account of scientific progress that 
might be called “the empirical account.” It holds that “science makes progress precisely when 
our theories become increasingly empirically adequate” (Dellsén 2018, Section 6). The 
advocates of the empirical account observe that the heliocentric theory was more successful 
than the geocentric theory, and then argue that replacing the geocentric theory with the 
heliocentric theory was progressive because the heliocentric theory was closer to empirical 
adequacy than the geocentric theory. The argument from double spaces implies that their 
inference requires the prior belief that the heliocentric theory was selected from the T-space. 
To say that the heliocentric theory was selected from the T-space means that, if the heliocentric 
theory is more successful than its competitor, it is closer to empirical adequacy than its 
competitor. By contrast, to say that the heliocentric theory was selected from the F-space means 
that, if it is more successful than its competitor, it is farther from the empirical adequacy than 
its competitor, i.e., it is comparatively empirically inadequate. The advocates of the empirical 
account have the burden of showing that the heliocentric theory was selected from the T-space. 
The argument from double spaces also works whether T is a scientific theory or a 
philosophical theory. For example, van Fraassen (1980, 112 & 130–134) claims that his 
contextual theory is correct, while its competitors (Hempel, 1966;  Salmon, 1971; Friedman, 
1974) are not, on the grounds that his can explain, while the others cannot, the phenomena in 
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science called “rejections” and “asymmetries” (Park 2019, 91). In short, after observing that 
the contextual theory is successful, he infers that it is true. The argument from double spaces 
implies that his inference requires the prior belief that the contextual theory was selected from 
the T-space. 
This prior belief needs to be established not only by those who believe that the contextual 
theory is true, but also by those who believe that it is comparatively true, empirically adequate, 
or comparatively empirically adequate. How does its truth differ from its empirical adequacy? 
 
The truth of the theory means that an explanation is an answer to a why-question, and that 
appropriateness of the answer depends on context. The empirical adequacy of the theory, on the 
other hand, means that what it explains, viz., the phenomena, such as rejections and asymmetries, 
occur in scientific practices. (Park 2017b, 61) 
 
Those who believe that the contextual theory is empirically adequate, but not true, believe that 
phenomena such as “rejections” and “asymmetries” occur in science, but not that “An 
explanation is an answer to a why-question” (van Fraassen 1980, 134). The argument from 
double spaces implies that the contextual theory, although more successful than its competitors, 
might be farther from empirical adequacy than they. 
In summary, the argument from a bad lot is built upon the idea that there might be 
unconceived alternatives to T, and the argument from double spaces is built upon the idea that 
the appearance of T might be misleading, and thus it is legitimate to distinguish between its 
appearance and its reality. The two arguments can be characterized by the following similar 
and simple questions: “Is T better than its unconceived alternatives?” and “Is T from the T-
space or the F-space?”  
Objectors might say that both the argument from a bad lot and the argument from double 
spaces are merely philosophical fantasies, i.e., they have no bearing on scientific practice. I 
admit that they have a point. I dare say, however, that the two arguments are similar to each 
other, as we noted above, so those who defend the argument from a bad lot cannot dismiss the 
argument from double spaces. They include not only van Fraassen (1989) and Mizrahi (2020) 
but also James Ladyman et al. (1997), Brad Wray (2008, 2012), and Kareem Khalifa (2010). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Scientific realists distinguish between the best of unsuccessful rival theories and the best of 
successful rival theories. They admit that the former is comparatively true, but not 
approximately true. However, they insist that the latter is both (approximately) true and 
comparatively true. By contrast, relative realists do not distinguish between the former and the 
latter, saying that both are comparatively true, but not approximately true. Relative realists’ 
position is predicated on the argument from a bad lot as well as on their fundamental belief that 
we cannot make the absolute judgment that T is successful. 
Relative realists’ fundamental belief clashes with Laudan’s definition of success and 
with those cases in which empirical equivalents are successful. In addition, the argument from 
double spaces undermines many philosophical inferences, including relative realists’ inference, 
if the argument from a bad lot undermines scientific realists’ inference. Given the similarities 
between the two arguments, it will be difficult for my opponents to show that the argument 
from a bad lot is strong, while the argument from double spaces is weak. I predict that my 
opponents’ future criticisms against the argument from double spaces will backfire on the 
argument from a bad lot, and that they will help us see the intrinsic flaws with the argument 
from a bad lot. 
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Finally, Mizrahi (2020) has other intriguing objections to scientific realism that he claims 
do not apply to relative realism. I reserve my responses to them for future occasions. 
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